The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 2 Fall 2017

Article 3

2017

Symposium Keynote: The DTSA and the New
Secrecy Ecology
Orly Lobel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Orly Lobel, Symposium Keynote: The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 Bus. Entrepreneurship & Tax L. Rev. 369 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/3

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository.

Lobel: DTSA New Secrecy Ecology

SYMPOSIUM KEYNOTE

The DTSA and the New Secrecy
Ecology
By Orly Lobel*

ABSTRACT
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), which passed in May 2016,
amends the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”), a 1996 federal statute that
criminalizes trade secret misappropriation. The EEA has been amended
several times in the past five years to increase penalties for violations and
expand the available causes of action, the definition of a trade secret, and
the types of behaviors that are deemed illegal. The creation of a federal
civil cause of action is a further expansion of the secrecy ecology, and the
DTSA includes several provisions that broaden the reach of trade secrets
and their protection. This article raises questions about the expansive trajectory of trade secret law and its relationship to entrepreneurship, information flow, and job mobility. Lobel argues that an ecosystem that supports innovation must balance secrecy with a culture of openness and exchanges of knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) created a federal civil cause of action
against the misappropriation of trade secrets for the first time in the nation’s history.
The DTSA was introduced by Senator Orrin G. Hatch on July 29, 2015,1 and passed
with little debate or controversy in both the House and Senate.2 On May 11, 2016,
President Obama signed the bill into law,3 which became effective immediately.
However, the DTSA is not without risk. This article discusses the potential perils
of the DTSA and the expansion of trade secret protection. In particular, it highlights
the ways the DTSA may be used for anti-competitive purposes, and how the DTSA
may have a negative impact on access to knowledge, collaboration, and talent mobility.
The first section describes the ways in which the DTSA expands the protections
that have traditionally been in the province of the states. The second section describes how this expansion should be understood as part of an already recently rebuffed federal secrecy ecology, especially in relation to the rise in criminal prosecutorial activity under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”). The section
also explains how traditionally trade secret law was treated with caution because of
its ambiguous policy effects. The third section analyzes these recent developments
from an innovation policy perspective, and highlights the potential risks of overprotection of valuable knowledge and human capital. In particular, the section considers whether the DTSA’s language adopts the controversial doctrine of inevitable
disclosure and explains why the doctrine can have harmful effects on innovation.

II.

AN EXPANSION ON ALL FRONTS

The DTSA established federal subject matter jurisdiction for the theft of trade
secrets, becoming “the most significant expansion of federal law in intellectual
property since the Lanham Act in 1946.”4 The DTSA expands the existing trade
secrecy ecology in several ways. First, rather than preempting state law, the DTSA
adds a federal cause of action.5 Second, the DTSA defines trade secrets and what
constitutes misappropriation more expansively. 6 Third, the DTSA includes unprecedentedly strong remedies.7
* This symposium article is based on Professor Orly Lobel’s keynote presentation at the March 10,
2017 symposium entitled “Implementing and Interpreting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,” hosted
by the University of Missouri School of Law’s Center for Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship and
the School’s Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review.
1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
2. Gregory Korte, Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, Allowing Companies to Sue, USA TODAY (May
11, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/11/obama-signs-trade-secrets-bill-allowing-companies-sue/84244258/.
3. Id.
4. Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S.
1890, H.R. 3326), CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposition%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf.
5. Bret A. Cohen et al., Explaining the Defend Trade Secrets Act, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/09/03_cohen.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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The DTSA expanded the trade secret ecology by amending the EEA to include
a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. 8 Traditionally, trade
secret law has been primarily a creature of state law. Thus, before the enactment of
the DTSA, absent diversity jurisdiction, or an independent federal cause of action,
owners of misappropriated trade secrets were limited to seeking remedies in state
courts.9 Prior to the enactment of the DTSA, a relatively uniform system of trade
secret law existed, as the vast majority of states had adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“UTSA”),10 while a few states continued to rely on common law.11 In
1996, Congress enacted the EEA, which established criminal penalties for theft of
trade secrets, but did not yet create a federal civil cause of action.12 The DTSA
amended the EEA to create a private cause of action for owners, both individuals
and corporations of misappropriated trade secrets.13 The amendment does not
preempt existing state trade secret law, and thereby allows the owner of a misappropriated trade secret to file under both federal and state law. 14 Now, owners of
trade secrets can bring civil actions in federal court as long as there has been trade
secret misappropriation “related to product[s] or service[s] used in, or intended for
use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”15
The DTSA includes very broad definitions of the terms “trade secret” and “misappropriation.” Trade secrets are defined as “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible,
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing.”16 This broad definition of a “trade secret” allows companies to file suits against the misappropriation of nearly any type
of knowledge, as long as the company can show the knowledge was secret, and
reasonable measures were taken to maintain its secrecy. The DTSA also broadly
defines “misappropriation” as an “acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know the trade secret was acquired by improper
means . . . or disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person” under certain conditions. 17
The remedies available under the DTSA are equally expansive. They include
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and awarding of attorney fees.18 Where
the trade secret is “willfully and maliciously misappropriated” a court may award
exemplary damages double the damage amount already awarded along with attorney’s fees where the misappropriation or claim of misappropriation was in bad
8. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
9. Cohen, supra note 5.
10. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
11. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§757-758 (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). In addition, several states provide criminal statutes for theft of trade secrets. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.05 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-1 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney
1965).
12. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2013).
13. Id.
14. Cohen, supra note 5.
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b) (West 2016).
16. Cohen, supra note 5.
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(5).
18. Id. § 1836(b)(3).
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faith.19 Furthermore, under “extraordinary circumstances,” a court can grant an ex
parte seizure order, which trade secret owners can apply for in order to prevent the
dissemination of a trade secret.20 Before granting the seizure, courts must find that
(1) a temporary restraining order or another form of equitable relief is inadequate,
and (2) that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur if the seizure is not ordered.”21 Again, this is an expansion upon previously existing state trade secret laws
where ex parte seizures are unavailable and as will be discussed further in the third
section, the remedy may negatively impact smaller and new companies in disputes
against incumbents.

III.

MARKET SECRECY AS A GOVERNMENT FRONTIER

The DTSA should be understood as part of a larger effort to curtail the loss of
proprietary information in current markets. The United States has been leading a
global campaign to strengthen trade secrecy laws and enforcement. 22 The U.S.
Trade Office in the past decade has strongly critiqued countries, and even the European Union, for failing to “have robust systems for protecting trade secrets, including deterrent penalties for criminal trade secret theft.” 23 Not coincidentally, in
May 2016, the same month the DTSA was enacted, the EU passed a new directive
“on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure.”24 On the domestic
front, the EEA was amended twice within the last few years to increase penalties, 25
to expand the scope of the statute, and the definition of misappropriation.26 The
EEA expanded the definition of a “trade secret” to include not only “products,” but
also information used in “services” involving interstate commerce.27
The effort to restrict trade secret misappropriation is also evident in the recent
increase of prosecutorial activity and educational efforts. Prosecutorial activity under the EEA has risen significantly. In the first five years of its enactment, there
were 11 prosecutions under the EEA.28 In the past decade, the number of

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § (b)(3)(C).
Id. § (b)(2)(A).
Id.
See Ambassador Ronald Kirk, 2012 Special 301 Report 17, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Apr. 2012), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Trade Secrets, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-secrets_en (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
25. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, H.R. 6029, 112th Cong.
(2013) (enacted) (amending §§ 1831 and 1832 to increase the maximum penalties).
26. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)) (changing “or included in a product that is produced for or placed in [foreign
commerce]” to “a product or service used in or intended for use in [interstate or foreign commerce]”)
(emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Derek Mason et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Federal Protection for Corporate Trade Secrets, 16 THE COMPUTER LAW 14 (1999); see also Robin L. Kuntz, How Not to Catch A Thief: Why the
Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 901, 90809 (2013) (describing cases prior to 2009 as “unicorn sightings”).
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prosecutions has increased dramatically to several hundreds of cases. 29 In addition
to increasing the amount of prosecutions, governmental educational efforts have
spread awareness on the importance of preventing and reporting trade secret theft. 30
The Department of Justice published a report about trade secret prosecutions,31 as
did the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,32 the Congressional
Research Service,33 and the U.S. Defense Security Service.34 In 2013, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Office of the United States
Trade Representative announced a joint strategic plan to mitigate trade secret
theft.35 As Rochelle Dreyfuss and I have argued in a previous article, the increased
criminal prosecution has been part of an overall rising secrecy focus, and the passage of a federal civil cause of action should be understood to be part of this ecology
as well.36
Dreyfuss and I have shown that these developments are a dramatic break with
the past.37 Federal law has always regulated patents, copyright, and trademark, but
trade secrets have traditionally been “strictly the province of the states.”38 In the
past, the common understanding was that trade secrecy law should be limited because its effects are “profoundly ambiguous.” 39
On the one hand, trade secrecy acts as an incentive to innovate (and a complement to patent protection); it is cheaper, can last longer, and covers advances that are not developed enough or sufficiently inventive to qualify
for patents. But trade secrecy protection can also act as a substitute for
patents. The more it reduces the risk of loss, the greater the temptation to
29. See Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Prosecuting Trade Secret and Economic Espionage Act Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 7 (Nov. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf; see also Peter J. Toren, A Look at 16 Years of EEA
Prosecutions, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/378560/a-look-at16-years-of-eea-prosecutions. According to an administration report, from 2009-2013, the FBI was involved in 20 cases—nearly double the total of the first five years. See Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 7 (Feb. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download [hereinafter Administration Strategy Report].
30. See Administration Strategy Report, supra note 29, at 12.
31. See Evan Williams, Border Searches In Trade Secret and Other Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 52,
53 (Nov. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2009/12/10/usab5705.pdf (including articles on issues arising in the prosecution of EEA cases, common defenses, parallel proceedings, use of electronic evidence, and sentencing); see also H. Marshall Jarrett et al., Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/03/26/prosecuting_ip_crimes_manual_2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
32. Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection of Industrial Espionage 2009-2011, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE (Oct. 2011), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-055.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX Report].
33. Charles Doyle, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of the Economic
Espionage Act, CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf.
34. Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, DEF.
SECURITY SERV., http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2012-unclass-trends.pdf (last visited Nov. 26,
2017).
35. Administration Strategy Report, supra note 29, at 2.
36. Rochelle Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade
Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 446 (2016).
37. Id. at 423.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 424-25.
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rely on trade secrets instead of patents. Since trade secrecy does not require
disclosure of the technical details of inventions, over-zealous trade secrecy
protection can chill innovation, reduce competition, impede entrepreneurship, and interfere with the government’s ability to regulate for safety,
health, and environmental concerns.40
Thus, trade secret laws have always been approached cautiously, with the understanding that defending trade secrets requires a very delicate balance, lest such
protections do more harm than good. The effect of the recent trends in strengthening
trade secret laws, in particular, the passage of the DTSA, must now be evaluated in
relation to the continuing goal of market innovation, including entrepreneurship,
the flow of knowledge, and job mobility.

IV.

POTENTIAL PERILS OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT
A. Trade Secrecy and Innovation Policy

In 2015, a group of law professors submitted a letter to Congress in opposition
to the DTSA.41 The opposition sprung from the DTSA’s broad scope and risk of
increasing the duration and cost of litigation, harming new businesses and innovators due to the ex parte seizure remedy, and the risk that, perversely, the DTSA
would result in less rather the more uniformity.42 In addition, the group was concerned that the Act might recognize the controversial doctrine of inevitable disclosure, which prevents former employees from accepting new jobs with competitors.43 This last concern will be the focus of the discussion below.
Almost by definition, intellectual property (“IP”) law restricts knowledge and
information from being shared.44 IP laws, therefore, are always about striking a delicate balance. The laws establish an incentive system to encourage innovation and
risk-taking.45 At the same time, the enclosure of knowledge must be limited in time
and scope to allow competitors and the next generation of innovators to build upon
previous innovation. From an innovation policy perspective, the question is therefore not how much or how little the DTSA protects secrets in abstract absolute
terms, but what line drawing best supports the pace of technological development,
economic growth, and progress in the arts and sciences. Ultimately, one must ask
whether a highly interlocking set of protections against trade secrecy leakage will
fuel, or conversely, erect barriers to innovation and social welfare. One must remember that, paradoxically, increased efforts to protect confidential information

40. Id. at 425.
41. Brook K. Baker et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014”
(S. 226) and the “Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233), CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1
(Aug.
26,
2014),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/FINAL%20Professors%27%20Letter%20Opposing%20Trade%20Secret%20Legis
lation.pdf. Full disclosure: I was part of the Law Professor’s Letter in Opposition to the DTSA.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and The Reach of Intellectual
Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 791 (2015).
45. Id. at 796.
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can hinder the production of such information and harm the innovative capabilities
of the economy.
Notably, the risk of expanding trade secrecy too broadly also relates to global
politics and the willingness of the United States to cooperate with other countries
in the joint interest of scientific and technological progress. Universities and private
companies may become fearful of individuals originating from outside the United
States coming in to deplete the talent pool, creating virtual national walls which
prevent fruitful exchange. As Dreyfuss and I have argued, the recent government
reports about the rising threat of trade secrecy loss include repeated referents to
“Chinese actors [as] the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators,”46 and to
“the many Russian immigrants with advanced technical skills who work for leading
U.S. companies.”47 The government’s educational material under the EEA frames
the protection of trade secrets as a national security issue by routinely focusing on
China and Russia as potential suspects and threats. 48 Dreyfuss and I conclude “the
argument for greater protection appears to derive at least some of its power from
xenophobia.”49 The argument is not that American businesses do not have a legitimate interest in protecting their trade secrets. Rather, one must understand that any
trade secrecy regime has trade-offs within itself: one must be cautious that the benefits of enhanced protections, warnings, monitoring, litigation, prosecution, and enforcement are not outweighed by the costs of chilling valuable innovation, exchanges, and collaboration.
Given their expansive, open-ended definition, trade secrets are the broadest
type of intellectual property.50 Because of their “do-it-yourself” nature, which does
not require application or registration, trade secrets do not come with a disclosure
or enablement requirement like patent law.51 Also, their duration is potentially the
longest: as long as they remain secret, the protection continues. 52 In other words,
trade secrets can include nearly any type of information and remain a secret forever.
On the other hand, trade secrets have always been considered a weak form of protection. In 1974, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a
state trade secrecy law against a preemption challenge by the federal patent act.53
The Court reasoned that trade secret law would not take knowledge out of the public
domain because trade secrets are weak forms of protection and, when possible,
companies would opt to patent their inventions instead.54 The Court stated that trade
secrets are so vulnerable to discovery that “[t]he possibility that an inventor who
believes his invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, [and] rely
on trade secret law . . . is remote indeed.”55 What was true in 1974 no longer appears

46. ONCIX Report, supra note 32, at i.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 36, at 438.
49. Id. at 426.
50. What is a Trade Secret?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
51. Patents or Trade Secrets?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/patent_trade.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
52. Id.
53. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
54. Id. at 484-85.
55. Id. at 490.
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to be true today. Current trade secrecy protection often acts as a substitute for patents.56
The stronger the protection, the greater the temptation to rely on trade secret
law rather than patent law.57 Both the strengthening of trade secret law and the uncertainty about patent eligibility of certain biotechnologies, business processes, and
software inventions may lead today’s firms to rely more heavily on trade secret
laws.58 This raises a red flag: since trade secret laws do not require disclosure of the
technical details of an invention, and protections are now strong both on the civil
and criminal side, the traditional balance struck in intellectual property law may be
disrupted.
The disruption of this delicate balance brings new risks. The new secrecy ecology, including the broad reach and expansive scope of the DTSA, can alter innovation environments in ways that chill scientific and technological progress. Because
they are secret in nature, empirical research on trade secrets has been inherently
difficult to conduct. Therefore, it is difficult to study the effects of recent policy
changes on private innovation, and any reform must proceed with caution. And yet,
as is discussed in the following section, many recent empirical studies provide indications of these risks, highlighting the effects of diminishing job mobility on economic growth, entrepreneurship, and the flow of knowledge.

B. Talent Mobility and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Trade secret law has a tripolar identity, embodying characteristics of statutory,
tort, and contract law. It is a pillar of intellectual property, a type of tort of unfair
business practices, and a relational contractual moderator. In effect, trade secret
laws regulate the relationship between employers and employees. As Professor
Dennis Crouch of the University of Missouri School of Law stated, because trade
secrecy disputes most commonly involve former employees, the DTSA becomes “a
shoe horn for contract and employment law claims.”59 The misappropriation component becomes a question of interpreting the duties that shaped the contractual
relationship.
Because of the centrality of intellectual property and human capital in today’s
knowledge-centered economy, employers unsurprisingly attempt to protect their secrets and limit the movement of their highly skilled workers to competitors. 60 Both
in civil litigation and criminal prosecution, the majority of cases have involved disputes between employers and their current or former employees.61 Trade secret disputes have expanded to new subject matters and modes of infringement. 62 For example, when trade secret law encompasses client lists, pricing information,
56. Orly Lobel, Filing for a Patent Versus Keeping Your Invention a Trade Secret, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/filing-for-a-patent-versus-keeping-your-invention-a-trade-secret.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Dennis Crouch, DTSA as a Shoe Horn for Contract and Employment Law Claims, PATENTLYO
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/contract-employment-claims.html.
60. See Office of Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1, 3 (Mar. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economicpolicy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf.
61. Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 36, at 461.
62. Id. at 466-67.
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marketing strategies, and business processes, employers can claim ownership over
knowledge which limits the ability for an employee to take a new position working
for a competitor or founding a new company.63
Moreover, in recent years, employment contracts routinely include non-disclosure agreements with expansive and open-ended lists of confidential information—
adding a contractual layer on top of statutory protections.64 The message to the job
market is simple: if employees use knowledge and information from a previous position, those employees may be the subject of criminal and civil prosecutions. 65 This
means that with every expansion of trade secret law, employees face higher risks
upon leaving an employer. In turn, the continued expansion of trade secrecy litigation risks chilling lawful exchanges of knowledge and talent. In a series of recent
publications, as well as in my book Talent Wants to Be Free, I analyze a range of
empirical evidence which suggests that curtailing the flow of talent and knowledge
can have detrimental effects on innovation.66
Entrepreneurship is especially harmed when workers fear leaving their employers. If employees are unable to use their knowledge, or human capital learned
through their employment with established firms, they are not only less likely to
leave, they are particularly less likely to go to less established, more vulnerable
entities.67 Consequently, employees are less likely to consider starting their own
businesses, build their own products, or create new services.68 Competitors might
also be reluctant to hire away employees for fear of being criminally or civilly prosecuted. Smaller, newer companies can be restricted from growing or entering a market by larger, long-established firms with more resources. 69 Such established firms
can threaten IP litigation for the purpose of stifling entrepreneurs as well as new
startups, and competitors.
Beyond the more general threat and costs of litigation under the DTSA, the
controversial ex parte seizure provision, could have particularly harmful effects on
small companies. If granted, the plaintiff can seize property to stop the usage and
spread of the trade secret without giving the defendant any opportunity to respond.70
However, the DTSA does limit the ex parte provisions to “extraordinary circumstances.”71 It requires parties show with “reasonable particularity” what property is
to be seized, and that the target would destroy the property if put on notice.72 And
yet, as one critique put it, “[s]o much business information can potentially qualify
as a trade secret that it is easy for unscrupulous plaintiffs to manufacture trade secret

63. See Office of Economic Policy, supra note 60, at 6-7.
64. Lobel, supra note 44, at 810.
65. See id. at 811-12.
66. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS,
AND FREE RIDING 141-52 (Yale Univ. Press 2013); Lobel, supra note 44, at 835; On Amir & Orly Lobel,
Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 836-38
(2013).
67. See Amir & Lobel, supra note 66, at 838-39.
68. Id. at 846.
69. Id. at 859.
70. Bill Donahue, Defend Trade Secrets Act: Lessons From Year 1, LAW360 (May 10, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/886926/defend-trade-secrets-act-lessons-from-year-1.
71. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A) (West 2016).
72. Id.
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claims and use them as strategic weapons.”73 Thus, the concern is that the ex parte
provision will be abused by larger companies predating against competitor
startups.74
Because of the risks that trade secrecy will be used in patterned ways against
competitors and former employees who want to move in the market, the controversial inevitable disclosure doctrine (“the doctrine”), which allows courts to issue an
injunction against taking on a new job was debated before its enactment.75 Under
the doctrine, a plaintiff can “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to
rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”76 The doctrine is controversial because it creates an ex-post de facto non-compete action against a former employee, even in the
absence of neither actual trade secret misappropriation, nor a non-compete clause
in the employee’s contract.77
Some states enforce the doctrine and permit courts to issue an injunction to
enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor if the court is convinced
the employee would “inevitably” use their former employer’s secrets in their new
position.78 Other states, such as California and Maryland, have explicitly rejected
the doctrine as bad policy.79 At least some evidence exists to suggest that states that
have adopted the doctrine experience less job mobility.80 In one study that compared
states that adopted the doctrine to those that reject it, researchers combined analyses
of state trade secrets laws on the inevitable disclosure doctrine with records of
changes of employers from the Current Population Survey to determine the effect
of inevitable disclosure on labor mobility.81 The study finds that in states where
courts have ruled against the doctrine there is “a 9.7 [%] increase in the probability
of a university-educated worker changing employer, and a statistically insignificant
3.6 [%] reduction in the probability of a less educated worker changing employer.” 82
Another study by Wharton researchers examines the consequences of adopting
the doctrine in Illinois.83 The researchers conclude that strengthening employerfriendly trade secrecy by adopting the doctrine adversely affects innovation. 84 The
researchers show that adoption of the doctrine is correlated with a decrease in patenting as well as a decrease in the quality of patents granted. 85 Comparing different
73. John Tanski, The Defend Trade Secrets Act is Strong Medicine. Is It Too Strong?, CORP. COUNS.
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202741205249/The-Defend-Trade-Secrets-Act-IsStrong-Medicine-Is-It-Too-Strong.
74. Cohen, supra note 5.
75. James Pooley, Trade Secret Bill Resolves ‘Inevitable Disclosure’ Controversy, LAW360 (Feb. 17,
2016, 10:43 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/759425/trade-secret-bill-resolves-inevitable-disclosure-controversy.
76. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
77. Pooley, supra note 75.
78. Id.
79. E.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); LeJeune v.
Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 458 (Md. 2004).
80. See Ivan P. L. Png & Sampsa Samila, Trade Secrets Law and Mobility: Evidence from “Inevitable
Disclosure”, SSRN (Feb. 14, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986775.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from the “Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine, FACULTY.WHARTON.UPENN.EDU (Oct. 2017), https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Trade-Secrets_IDD_Oct-2017.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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types of patents that would more likely lend themselves to substitution by secrecy,
the study rules out the possibility that the effect is due to a shift away from patent
protection to trade secrecy.86 Rather, the researchers conclude that the more likely
mechanism that explains the decline in innovation is that of dampened employee
incentives in an increased secrecy environment. 87 The study explains that when job
mobility is more of a possibility, employee inventors are incentivized to innovate
to signal their quality in the job market.88 When mobility is constrained by an increased secrecy ecology, this incentive structure is curtailed.89
Given the controversial and problematic nature of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the final language of the DTSA represents a compromise between the two
opposing approaches of states which adopted, and states which rejected it.90 The
DTSA states that an injunction issued under the DTSA may not “prevent a person
from entering into an employment relationship,” and any conditions placed on a
former employee’s employment in an injunction must be based on “evidence of
threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the person
knows.”91 The language of “threatened misappropriation” could be interpreted as a
basis for adopting the concept of inevitable disclosure. Yet, the DTSA specifies that
the order may not “otherwise conflict with an applicable [s]tate law prohibiting restraints on the practice of lawful profession, trade, or business.” 92 This could be
understood to prohibit the adoption of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in states,
primarily California, that deem non-compete clauses void. It could further be interpreted to prohibit the adoption of the doctrine in any state that has explicitly rejected
the doctrine under its state trade secret law.
The DTSA’s first year shows there is, at the very least, uncertainty about
whether this eventual language allows the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
under the DTSA. In one DTSA case, the federal court in the Northern District of
Illinois issued an injunction against an employee seeking to join a competitor.93 The
case involved an employee downloading files onto a personal thumb drive before
taking a job with a competitor, and the case was litigated under both the DTSA and
the Illinois Trade Secrets Act.94 While Illinois has explicitly adopted the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure, the facts of this case indicate an actual misappropriation such
that the injunction does not represent the stronger and more controversial scenario
of inevitable disclosure, which involves no showing of actual taking of information.95
Less than a month later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine and issued a temporary restraining

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Pooley, supra note 75.
91. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (West 2016).
92. Id.
93. Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71700
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).
94. Id. at *2-4.
95. Id. at *13; see also Scott Humphrey, Illinois Federal Court Allows Inevitable Disclosure Theory
in Defend Trade Secrets Act Case, LEXOLOGY (June 28, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c1b3d8ad-e553-436f-ab6f-1ba11e3e16e2.
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order (“TRO”) when an employee sought to move to a direct competitor.96 The former employer claimed the employee had access to confidential information, including “customer lists, price lists, and marketing and sales strategies.”97 The district
court issued a TRO, stating that if the former employee began work with the competitor, he would likely “be assigned to solicit his former clients” and would “likely
use his specialized and confidential knowledge to the detriment of Fres-co.”98 On
appeal to the Third Circuit, the Court explained that under both the Pennsylvania
Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the DTSA, “misappropriation of trade secrets need
not have already occurred to warrant injunctive relief; threatened misappropriation
is sufficient.”99
The court cited the Circuit’s leading case that applied the inevitable disclosure
doctrine:100
Given the substantial overlap (if not identity) between Hawkins’s work for
Fres-co and his intended work for Transcontinental—same role, same industry, and same geographic region—the District Court was well within
its discretion to conclude Hawkins would likely use his confidential
knowledge to Fres-co’s detriment.101
The uncertainty of the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under
the DTSA can be linked to other problematic aspects of the DTSA. The DTSA does
not require a plaintiff to identify with particularity prior to discovery, the alleged
trade secrets that were misappropriated.102 By contrast, under California law, a
plaintiff must identify the allegedly stolen trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” before discovery in order “to limit the permissible scope of discovery.”103 California courts have explained that the requirement “prevents plaintiffs from using
the discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant’s trade secrets.”104 It is
uncertain whether the California requirement will continue to apply in disputes between Californian litigants under the DTSA. In Space Data Corp. v. X, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s DTSA claim, in part for its failure to adequately identify
the trade secrets at issue.105 However, in Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud,
Inc., the court applied Illinois’s UTSA law in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s DTSA claim for failure to identify the alleged trade secrets.106
More generally, courts have been far from uniform in how they interpret the
DTSA. In Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, the court noted “that substantively
the UTSA and DTSA are ‘essentially the same’ . . . and that courts may look to the
96. Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, No. 16-3591, 2017 WL 2376568, at **2 (3d Cir. June 1,
2017).
97. Id. at **3.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2010).
101. Fres-co Sys. USA, 2017 WL 2376568, at **3.
102. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2005); Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1107,
1111 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
104. Loop Al Labs Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d at 1112 (quoting Lillith Games (Shanghai) Co. Ltd v. uCool,
Inc., No. 15-CV-01265-SC, 2015 WL 4149066, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2017)).
105. Space Data Corp. v. X, No. 16-cv-03260-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22571, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 16, 2017).
106. Mission Measurement Corp. v. Blackbaud, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 915, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/3

12

Lobel: DTSA New Secrecy Ecology

No. 2]

Lobel; The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology

381

state UTSA when interpreting the DTSA.”107 Consequently, at least in that case, the
court applied the existing interpretation of Wisconsin’s UTSA to interpret the
DTSA.108 Similarly, in Henry Schein v. Cook, a California district court said the
DTSA and California’s UTSA have similar definitions of trade secret and then used
California law to determine if the information at issue even qualified as a trade secret.109 At the same time, the DTSA is a new law with different language and provisions, and uncertainty remains regarding the relationship between the new DTSA
and state law. For example, the DTSA defines “misappropriation” broadly, and contains examples of unauthorized appropriations which are not listed in the UTSA. 110
These examples include transmitting, communicating, duplicating, and sketching,
which suggests that even benign activities, like memorization, may be actionable. 111
The professors’ opposition letter warned that “the DTSA would undermine this high
degree of uniformity by creating new differences with existing state law and by
requiring the development of a new body of federal jurisprudence.”112 The concerns
raised in the letter now seem to materialize with the nascent jurisprudence under the
DTSA.
While the DTSA presents a range of risks for employees, one promising aspect
of the DTSA is the establishment of whistleblower protections for individuals who
disclose trade secrets to a government official to report or investigate a violation of
law, or to an attorney in an under-seal complaint or filing. 113 In other words, the
DTSA gives employees immunity from criminal or civil liability for reporting illegalities. The DTSA requires notice of this immunity in all employment contracts. 114
Since 2016, all employers are required to provide a notice-of-immunity to employees and contractors “in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs
the use of a trade secret or other confidential information.”115 Failure to inform employees of whistleblower immunity bars employers from seeking punitive damages
and attorneys’ fees when suing former employees for trade secret misappropriations
under the DTSA.116 Although this is a positive development, it is an exception that
points to the larger rule: employees are at increased risk in all other activities that
potentially implicate the broad scope of trade secrets. A better policy would specify
more clearly what constitutes “proper means” of acquisition and would include a
broader range of immunities.

V.

CONCLUSION

The DTSA has created unprecedented power in the hands of federal courts to
oversee the contemporary trade secrecy ecology. In interpreting the new DTSA,
107. Matthew Werdegar & Warren Braunig, Jury’s Still Out on the Impact of the Defend Trade Secrets
Act, INSIDE COUNS. (May 3, 2017), https://www.keker.com/Templates/media/files/Articles/Inside%20Counsel%20Werdegar%20Braunig%20DTSA.pdf.
108. Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Circo, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 789, 797 (W.D. Wis. 2017).
109. Henery Shein v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
110. Goldman, supra note 4, at 7.
111. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West 2016).
112. Goldman, supra note 4, at 7.
113. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1833(b)(1).
114. Id. § (b)(3).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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courts must aim to appease legitimate concerns about the importance of secrecy in
an industry, while also maintaining the traditional delicate balance intellectual property law seeks to strike between incentivizing innovation and cultivating vibrant,
creative and inventive environments. In particular, one should aim to ensure that
the DTSA is not used to prevent employees from moving from one job to another,
and from using their basic skills and experience in their professional lives.
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